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Abstract
We ¯nd and compare two simple ¯scal rules. The ¯rst is a theoretical rule that
approximates well Ramsey-optimal ¯scal policy in a DSGE model calibrated to the
U.S. economy over the period 1955:1 to 2007:3; The second is an empirical rule that
approximates well actual U.S. ¯scal policy over the same period. Our main ¯ndings
are: First, Ramsey-optimal ¯scal policy displays limited volatility even in the presence
of sticky prices, while public debt absorbs most of the shocks. Second, actual U.S.
¯scal policy is excessively counter-cyclical. Ramsey-optimal ¯scal policy is negatively
correlated with output over the business cycle, as expansions generate reduction in the
level of public debt and the tax rate and vice versa. On the other hand, actual ¯scal
policy is positively correlated with output as the tax rate is raised during expansions
and reduced during recessions. Third, actual ¯scal policy is inconsistent with long-run
debt sustainability over the period considered.
Address of corrisponding author:
Luisa Lambertini, , EPFL CDM CFI, ODY 2 01 B, Station 5, CH-1015 Lausanne,
Switzerland. E-mail: luisa.lambertini@ep°.ch
¤Luisa Lambertini acknowledges the hospitality of the Fiscal Policies Division of the European Central
Bank. We would like to thank Jos¶ e Mar¶ ³n Arcas and Jean-Pierre Vidal for their comments and support.
yEuropean Central Bank, Fiscal Policies Division
zEPFL and Claremont McKenna College
21 Introduction
This paper studies how a benevolent ¯scal authority should use ¯scal policy to stabilize
the economy and then uses it as a benchmark to evaluate actual ¯scal policy in the United
States. We analyze the optimal response of taxes and budget surpluses to temporary shocks
to technology and government spending in an economy characterized by a number of frictions
including incomplete capital markets, distortionary income taxes and sticky prices. In such
environment public debt displays unit-root behavior in response to temporary shocks, which
in turn requires an adjustment of the tax rate to guarantee the long-run sustainability of
public ¯nances. Unlike in frictionless environments, the tax rate cannot and should not be
held constant in response to a temporary shock. And because taxes are distortionary, it
matters for welfare when and how they are changed. Optimal ¯scal stabilization is therefore
a necessary and well-de¯ned policy in our setup.
Our paper builds on two distinct literatures. The former is mainly theoretical and it stud-
ies optimal monetary and ¯scal policy in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models. Earlier contributions by Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari et al. (1991) focus
on frictionless environments and ¯nd that state-contingent returns on government debt or
state-contingent taxes on capital absorb most of the shocks to the government budget con-
straint. When the government issues nominal non-state-contingent debt, the price level is
very volatile to make the real returns on debt state-contingent. The tax rate on labor income
is remarkably stable over the business cycle and it displays the persistence properties of the
original shocks. Later contributions focus on environments with frictions. Aiyagari et al.
(2002) consider an economy where the government can issue only real non-state-contingent
debt and ¯nd that optimality of ¯scal policy imposes unit-root behavior on the tax rate and
public debt. In an economy with price stickiness and nominal non-state-contingent public
debt, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a, 2006) ¯nd that public debt and the labor income
tax rate display random walk behavior in response to temporary shocks. In°ation, on the
other hand, is remarkably stable even if the degree of price stickiness is small.
The second literature we build on is more empirical and it focuses on estimating the
dynamic e®ects of ¯scal policy on macroeconomic variables. Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
use a structural VAR whose identi¯cation relies on estimates of output elasticities of ¯scal
variables. This allows them to identify ¯scal shocks that can then be used to trace their
e®ects on the economy. They ¯nd that a government spending shock temporarily raises both
output and consumption. This stylized fact is hard to reproduce in standard DSGE models,
which typically predict a fall in private consumption. As a solution to this puzzle, Gal¶ ³
et al. (2007) propose a model with rule-of-thumb consumer, a key hypothesis, along with
a Non-Walrasian labor market. These ingredients generate a positive response of private
consumption and wages to a positive government spending shock. Their model assumes
a linear ¯scal rule where a lump-sum tax responds to the stock of debt and government
spending. The coe±cients of their ¯scal rule are calibrated to replicate some moments of
U.S. data analyzed with both a 4- and a 8-variable VAR. They assign positive coe±cients
to both debt and government spending. Bilbiie et al. (2006) suggest that the response to
3government spending shocks has changed considerably in the United States in the last twenty
years and relate such change to increased asset-market participation. They consider a model
where a fraction of agents are rule-of-thumb consumers and where ¯scal policy follows a rule
in which the government de¯cit depends on its own lag, the stock of debt and government
spending. Then they ¯nd a number of parameter values, among which the degree of market
participation, which minimize the distance between the empirical impulse responses and
the impulse responses generated by the model. Their key ¯nding is that the percentage of
rule-of-thumb consumers has fallen signi¯cantly since the early 1980s.
Our work focuses on ¯scal policy in an environment with frictions. We characterize
optimal ¯scal policy in a setting where the government issues nominal non-state-contingent
debt, prices are sticky, steady-state output is sub-optimally low because of monopolistic
competition and monetary policy follows an interest-rate rule. Hence, our modeling choices
are close to the extant literature. The non-state-contingency of public debt gives unit-root
behavior to public bonds and tax rate in our model, consistent with earlier ¯ndings.
The novelty of our paper is that we evaluate actual ¯scal policy using optimal ¯scal policy
as a benchmark. Our approach summarizes ¯scal policy via a simple, linear tax rule that
describes how the labor income tax rate responds to a few variables, estimates an optimal
and an actual ¯scal rule in order to compare them. To be precise, ¯rst we summarize optimal
¯scal policy by choosing the parameter values of the linear tax rule that minimize the distance
between the impulse responses generated by the model with the linear tax rule and those
generated by optimal ¯scal policy. Then we summarize actual ¯scal policy by choosing the
parameter values of the linear tax rule that minimize the distance between the empirical
impulse responses and those generated by the rule. At this point we have an optimal and an
actual linear tax rule that we can compare. Since both tax rules have the same linear form,
we can meaningfully compare the sign and size of the coe±cients.
We ¯nd that, under optimal ¯scal policy, the optimal labor income tax rate increases in
response to a positive government spending shock and decreases in response to a positive
technological shock. The bulk of the adjustment of the labor income tax rate occurs in the
¯rst few quarters after the shock, with its pro¯le being practically °at after that. Neverthe-
less, the optimal labor income tax rate has limited volatility over the business cycle. The
optimal labor income tax rate increases with public debt. Intuitively, a higher debt level
raises steady-state interest payments, thereby raising the ¯nancing needs of the government
in the long run. To collect larger revenues the government must therefore raise the tax
rate. The implications of optimal tax policy for the budget balance are that the government
should run surpluses when faced with positive technological shocks and de¯cits when faced
with positive shocks to government spending. Budget balances under optimal ¯scal policy
are not simply pro-cyclical with respect to output. In fact, it is optimal to run budget de¯cits
in response to a positive government spending shock even if the short-run e®ect on output
is positive.
As for actual tax policy in the United States, we ¯nd that the tax rate responds positively
both to a positive government spending shock (as predicted by optimal ¯scal policy) and to a
positive technological shock. The latter prediction is at odds with the prediction of optimal
4¯scal policy. A plausible interpretation of this ¯nding is that U.S. tax policy has raised the
labor income tax rate during expansions and lowered it during recessions. However, such
policy is sub-optimal when output movements are due to technological shocks. A temporary
technological improvement raises the real wage and discourages the supply of labor. The
optimal labor income tax falls to prevent a sharp reduction in hours worked and, as a
result, the expansionary e®ect on output is stronger. In a sense, U.S. tax policy has been
excessively counter-cyclical. The empirical impulse responses support this interpretation of
how U.S. tax policy has operated. Budget surpluses are small and barely signi¯cant following
a technological shock and the output response is lower than what is predicted under optimal
¯scal policy. U.S. tax rates have responded negatively to public debt, unlike what is predicted
by optimal ¯scal policy. Hence, larger public debt ratios have been accompanied by lower tax
rates. This ¯nding casts some doubts over the long-run sustainability of U.S. ¯scal policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
Section 3 shows our calibration to the U.S. economy. In Sections 4 and 5 we characterize
optimal ¯scal policy and the dynamics under such policy. We discuss and estimate our
simple, linear ¯scal rule in Section 6. Our methodology is presented in Section 7 while we
estimate our empirical rule in Section 8. Section 9 discusses the robustness of our ¯ndings
and Section 10 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
We model a closed economy inhabited by a representative agent whose preferences are de-
¯ned over per capita consumption and per capita hours worked. The model below draws
extensively from Lambertini (2007), which studies optimal ¯scal policy in a two-country






where 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor, Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator
conditional on information available at the beginning of period t, ct is consumption and
nt is hours worked in period t. Per capita consumption is de¯ned over a continuum of











where ct(i) is consumption of good i at time t and µ > 1 is the constant elasticity of
substitution among the individual goods. Pt(i) is the price of good i in period t. The price









5which is the minimum cost of a unit of the aggregate consumption good de¯ned by (2), given
individual good prices Pt(i).
We assume that each di®erentiated good uses a specialized labor input in its production
and that the representative individual supplies all of the types of labor. In this case, all
households have exactly the same wage incomes without the need to assume the existence
of competitive ¯nancial markets where wage risks are e±ciently traded. Let nt(i) be labor






All households start with the same ¯nancial assets and own an equal share of all the

































Wt(i) is the nominal wage of labor of type i in period t and wt(i) is the corresponding real
wage. ©t(i) are the nominal pro¯ts of the ¯rm producing good i in period t and ¦t(i) are
the corresponding real pro¯ts. We assume that each household owns the same share of all
the ¯rms in the economy. B
p
t is the purchase by each household of a riskless, one-period,
nominal non-state-contingent bond. In real terms, such purchase is b
p
t. The bond is issued
in period t, it can be purchased at the price of 1=(1+it) and it pays one unit of consumption
in period t+1. ¿t is a labor income tax levied by the government at time t. Each household















The household maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (4) and the transver-
sality condition (5). Household's consumption must be optimally allocated across all di®er-
entiated goods. Expenditure on good i is negatively related to the relative price of good i







The lagrangean multiplier on the household's budget constraint at time t is ¸t, which is equal
to the marginal utility with respect to consumption
Uc(ct;nt) = ¸t: (7)
6As noted before, we assume incomplete ¯nancial markets as the only asset available is a
riskless, non-contingent nominal bond. This implies that households are unable to fully
eliminate uncertainty from their consumption and incomes. The optimal choice of bond







where ¼t+1 ´ pt+1=pt is the (gross) in°ation rate between t + 1 and t. At last, households
choose the optimal quantity for each labor type to supply, given the wages they face and the
labor income tax rate. For each labor type i, the optimal supply satis¯es the condition
¡Un(ct;nt(i)) = ¸twt(i)(1 ¡ ¿t); (9)
where Un(ct;nt(i)) is the marginal disutility of supplying labor of type i. Everything else
being equal, an increase in the labor income tax at time t reduces labor supply.
2.2 Firms
For simplicity, we assume that ¯rms produce using labor only. More precisely, ¯rm i produces
good i using the production function
yt(i) = atnt(i); (10)
where at is an exogenous stochastic technological factor common to all ¯rms. Hence, we
abstract from ¯rm-speci¯c technological shocks to assume instead that shocks are common
to all ¯rms in the economy.







(ct + gt) (11)
where ct;gt are total private and public consumption. We assume that government consump-
tion is distributed across all type of goods produced in the economy and that its allocation
on each type of good follows the same rule as (6). Hence, the demand function (11) follows
directly from (6).
We consider price stickiness along the lines of the Calvo model. Every period, a fraction
Á 2 [0;1) of randomly chosen ¯rms does not change price and meets demand at the posted
price; the remaining fraction 1 ¡ Á of ¯rms sets the price optimally. In every period, ¯rm i



























7In the expression above, mct is the Lagrangean multiplier associated with the constraint that
production meets demand. Every period ¯rm i chooses how much labor to hire, given the





which shows the (real) marginal cost of producing good i is equal to the real wage faced by
¯rm i per unit of output produced. If ¯rm i is allowed to change its price at time t, it also




















where yt = ct + gt is total aggregate demand at time t, which the ¯rm takes as given. The
optimal price at time t is such that expected future marginal revenues (the right-hand side
of (14) equal expected future marginal costs (the left-hand side of (14).1
We abstract from production subsidies that bring long-run output levels are at their
competitive levels. As a result, the deterministic steady state around which we approximate
our economy is suboptimal and it is therefore inappropriate to use ¯rst-order approximations
to the equilibrium conditions for second-order-accurate welfare evaluation. To retain the non-
linearity of (14) and use second-order linear approximations to the equilibrium conditions,




















































Let ~ Pt be the price chosen by the ¯rms that can update their prices at time t and
~ pt ´ ~ Pt=Pt. The dynamics of prices follows
1 = Á¼
µ¡1
t + (1 ¡ Á)~ p
1¡µ
t : (18)
1We focus on a symmetric equilibrium where all ¯rms that change their prices in a given period choose
exactly the same price.
82.3 Monetary and Fiscal Policies
In this cashless economy monetary policy amounts to controlling the nominal interest rate.
We assume that the central bank is (instrument) independent from the ¯scal authority in
the sense that it has full control over the its monetary policy instrument. We consider the
case where the monetary policy instrument is the nominal interest rate. Let Rt ´ 1 + it be
























where variables without a time subscript indicate their the steady-state values. This is a
generalized Taylor rule whereby the nominal interest rate is adjusted in response to in°ation
and the output gap, de¯ned as the di®erence between actual and steady-state output. The
parameter Ár captures interest rate smoothing. We estimate our benchmark interest rate
rule using data from 1955:1 to 2007:4 and obtain Áy = 0:11;Á¼ = 1:07;Áyy = 0:06;Ár = 0:92
and this parameter combination ensures a locally unique equilibrium.
In period t, the ¯scal authority spends gt on the goods produced in the economy, it levies
the labor income tax ¿t and it issues public debt B
g
t. Concerning government spending, we
assume it is exogenous and stochastic. In fact, in section XX we will calibrate steady-state
government spending to match the data and then consider the optimal tax response to an
unexpected spending shock. In our model government spending does not enter the utility
function of the representative agent. While we believe that most government consumption is
not truly wasteful, our analysis would not be a®ected at all if government spending entered
additively the utility function.
Given gt, the ¯scal authority (or government henceforth) decides how much of it should
be ¯nanced via tax revenues and how much via issuing new debt. The budget constraint for









































2.4 Aggregation and Equilibrium
Let xt ´
R




















Aggregating over all the ¯rms in the economy, we obtain the condition for equilibrium in the
goods market:
atnt = xtyt; (24)






Given a sequence of tax rates ¿s and initial conditions, a competitive equilibrium is a
set of sequences cs;ns;bp
s;ws;¼s;vs;vvs;mcs;xs;is; ~ ps;¸s;bg
s;as;gs that satisfy (4), (7) -(9),
(13), (15)-(20), (24)-(25), given the stochastic processes for technological and government
consumption shocks and initial conditions.
3 Calibration
We calibrate our model to the post-1955 U.S. economy. The time unit is a quarter and we
assume that the period utility function is:
U(c;n) = log(c) + dlog(1 ¡ n):
We set the parameter d equal to 2 to match a steady-state working time of one third. The
discount factor ¯ is 0.99, which is consistent with a steady-state real rate of return of 4.1
percent a year. We assign a value of 1/3 to the parameter Á that captures the fraction of
¯rms that can change their prices in any given quarter. This value implies an average life
span of prices of 4.5 months and it is in line with the ¯ndings of Bils and Klenow (2004)
but shorter than the life span suggested by Sbordone (2002) and Clarida et al. (1999). The
steady-state gross in°ation rate is one. The price-elasticity of demand µ is set equal to 11
that implies a steady-state mark-up of 10 percent, as consistent with the work of Basu and
Fernald (1997).
In our benchmark speci¯cation we set the parameters of the interest rate rule as follows:
Áy = 0:08;Á¼ = 1:8 and ÁR = 0:84. These parameter values are in line with those of Smets
and Wouters (2007), except that we do not include a short-run feedback from the change in
output gap. Our benchmark rule explains almost 90 percent of the °uctuations in the federal
fund rate since 1955. In section 9 we discuss the implications for our ¯ndings of alternative
values for the parameters of the interest-rate rule.
Government consumption is calibrated to be 17 percent of GDP at the steady state, which
is equal to the empirical U.S. average since 1983. Government consumption and technology
are assumed to follow the stochastic processes




¯ 0.99 Subjective discount factor
d 2 Calibrated to match N = 0:3
µ 11 Calibrated to match 1.1 gross value-added markup
Á 1/3 Degree of price stickiness
Áy 0.11 Coe±cient on output
Á¼ 1.07 Coe±cient on in°ation
ÁR 0.92 Coe±cient on lagged interest rate
Áyy 0.06 Coe±cient on lagged growth rate
g=Y 0.17 Government consumption to GDP ratio
bg=Y 0.6 Government debt to GDP ratio
½g 0.94 Serial correlation of lngt
¾g 0.0106 Standard deviation of innovation to lngt
½a 0.84 Serial correlation of lnat
¾a 0.0078 Standard deviation of innovation to lnat
Table 1: Structural parameters
lnat = (1 ¡ ½a)lna + ½a lnat¡1 + ²
a
t; (27)
where g;a are the steady-state values of technology and government consumption, respec-
tively. We estimate the parameters ½g;¾g;½a;¾a from the VAR whose impulse response
functions we match in section 8.2 We impose a debt-to-GDP ratio for the government of
60 percent per year, which is close to the average federal debt-to-GDP ratio over the period
1947-2007. Together with government consumption, this implies a steady-state labor income
tax rate of 19.4 percentage points. Table 1 summarizes the values assigned to the parameters
of our model.
4 Ramsey Fiscal Policy
We characterize the fully optimal ¯scal policy when the ¯scal authority e®ectively has access
to a commitment technology. This is the sequence of tax rates f¿sg the ¯scal authority com-
mits in advance to and such that the utility of the representative consumer (1) is maximized.
In plain words, the fully optimal ¯scal policy is the sequence of tax rates that implements
the competitive equilibrium associated with the highest social welfare.
In a more formal way, our fully optimal ¯scal policy is a set of sequences cs;ns;bp
s;ws;¼s;vs,
vvs;mcs;xs;is; ~ ps;¸s;bg
s;as;gs and ¿s for s ¸ t that maximize (1) subject to the competitive-
equilibrium conditions (4), (7) -(9), (13), (15)-(20), (24)-(25), the values of the lagrangean
2The VAR is described in detail in section 7. More precisely, we run a VAR with six variablesfrom which
we obtain the standard deviation of government expenditure and labor productivity, ¾g and ¾a. We estimate
the autocorrelation coe±cient ½g by regressing the impulse response of government spending to a government
spending shock on its ¯rst lag. We estimate ½a in an analogous manner.
11multipliers associated with those conditions for s < t, the stochastic processes for technolog-
ical and government consumption and initial conditions.
Our de¯nition of fully optimal ¯scal policy is equivalent to the Ramsey equilibrium
concept except that our ¯rst-order conditions for period t are not di®erent from the others.
This the concept called \optimal from the timeless perspective" of Woodford (2003). Our
results are therefore directly comparable with those that focus on stationary allocation rules.3
5 Dynamics under Ramsey Fiscal Policy
We approximate the dynamics under Ramsey ¯scal policy by taking a second-order ap-
proximation to the equilibrium conditions. As stated earlier, long-run output is below its
perfectly competitive level in our setting because we abstract from the existence of produc-
tion subsidies. This makes the use of ¯rst-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions
inappropriate.4
The left-hand side of Table 2 reports the standard deviation, serial correlation and corre-
lation with output of some macroeconomic variables of interest in our model. These moments
have been computed using a Monte Carlo simulation of our benchmark economy with struc-
tural parameters as speci¯ed in Table 1. We performed 2000 simulations of 200 quarters and
we present the average moments of our 2000 simulations.
An interesting result of our simulation is that in°ation and the gross nominal interest
rate display little volatility under Ramsey ¯scal policy. It is known that optimal monetary
policy makes in°ation extremely stable over the business cycle even in an environment with
little price stickiness.5 Notice, however, that monetary policy is not optimal in our model
but follows an interest-rate rule with smoothing.
Changes in the level of public debt absorb most of the impact of unanticipated shocks,
even though the tax rate also displays some volatility. The standard deviation of the tax rate
under Ramsey we ¯nd here is much higher than the one in Chari et al. (1994). However, they
characterize optimal monetary and ¯scal policy and monetary policy is the shock absorber
since prices are °exible in their setup and in°ation variability is costless. Ramsey ¯scal
policy predicts that the income tax rate should be pro-cyclical over the business cycle, in
the sense that the tax rate on average increases when output goes up and vice versa, with
correlation coe±cient of 0.48. Later we will show that the optimal tax rate rises in the short
run in response to government spending and technology being above average. The standard
deviation of the tax rate under Ramsey in our setup is higher than that in Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2006). They ¯nd that the tax rate should be negatively correlated with output
while we ¯nd the opposite. These di®erences are explained by two factors. First, monetary
policy is not optimal in our model but follows a Taylor-type rule that implies a di®erent
response of the nominal interest rate to shocks. Since Ramsey ¯scal policy is sensitive to
3For example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006).
4We compute second-order accurate solutions to the equilibrium conditions using the methodology of
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b).
5See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a).
12nominal interest rates, which are inversely related to the price of nominal bonds, the optimal
tax rate in the two models is also di®erent. Second, we have a simpler setup that does not
feature investment, habit persistence as well as a number of frictions that are likely to make
the optimal tax rate less volatile.
The right-hand side of Table 2 reports the empirical second moments for the United
States over the period 1955 to 2007. The second moments of the data are larger than those
under Ramsey ¯scal policy, although comparable. We report the second moments of two
tax rates. The ¯rst, ¿, is an average tax rate obtained dividing revenues from personal
current taxes by the wages and salary disbursed in the economy, which are both available
at a quarterly frequency. ¿CBO is the e®ective personal income tax rate calculated by the
Congressional Budget O±ce. This rate is available at annual frequency from 1979 to 2005.
¿nber is the U.S. federal average marginal income tax rate on wages in the NBER TAXSIM
model. This is a rate available at annual frequency from 1960 to 2007. Here we assume
that the tax rate remained constant throughout the four quarters in each calendar year. All
three tax rates display higher standard deviation than the rate under Ramsey. ¿ and ¿cbo are
average tax rates that display low but positive correlation with output. Part of this positive
correlation may be due to the progressivity of the U.S. tax system whereby an increase in
income may bump taxpayers to a higher tax bracket and result in a higher income tax rate
without a ¯scal policy change. Being the average marginal tax rate, ¿nber does not su®er from
this problem. The U.S. marginal tax rate displays very little and negative correlation with
output.
To gain further understanding of the dynamics under Ramsey ¯scal policy, we present
the theoretical impulse responses to the two shocks (government spending and technology)
of our model. Figure 1 shows the impulse response of a number of macroeconomic variables
to a one percentage point increase in government purchases. It is optimal to ¯nance an
increase in government spending in part by raising the labor income tax and in part by
running budget de¯cits. Budget de¯cits permit a smoother path of taxation that spreads
over time the distortions stemming from it. An increase in government purchases raises
aggregate demand and the demand for labor, which in turn raises the real wage and labor
supply, despite the increase in taxes. As a result, output also increases in the short run.
In°ation goes up, as typical in response to an aggregate demand shock, which in turn raises
the nominal interest rate. Taxes and public debt display unit-root behavior in our model
in the sense that public debt (nominal and real) and therefore the tax rate move to a new
permanently higher level in response to a temporary shock. But a higher steady-state tax
rate leads to lower hours worked, output and private consumption in the long run.
Figure 2 reports the impulse response of the same macroeconomic variables analyzed in
Figure 1 in response to a technological shock. A positive supply shock raises the marginal
productivity of labor and thereby the real wage in the short run. As a result, private
consumption, leisure and output increase in the short run. In°ation falls temporarily, thereby
lowering the nominal interest rate. The optimal ¯scal response consists in raising the tax
rate in the short run and then reduce it to its long-run level. As a result budget surpluses
arise that reduce the debt level in the long run.
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a Government Spending Shock
All variables are expressed in percentage point deviations from their steady-state values.
The length of the impulse responses is 40 quarters.
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock
All variables are expressed in percentage point deviations from their steady-state values.
The length of the impulse responses is 40 quarters.
15Variable Ramsey Fiscal Policy Data
Standard Serial Correlation Standard Serial Correlation
Deviation Correlation w Output Deviation Correlation w Output
bg 19.00 0.99 -0.38 12.69 0.99 -0.06
1 + i 0.20 0.99 -0.23 0.44 0.92 0.16
¼ 0.38 0.65 -0.23 0.47 0.76 0.30
w 1.45 0.84 0.83 2.95 0.97 0.24
n 0.87 0.66 -0.46 1.24 0.96 0.32
y 0.87 0.97 1.00 2.84 0.95 1.00
c 1.00 0.97 0.85 2.05 0.98 0.84
def=y 0.78 0.75 -0.50 1.68 0.92 -0.47
¿ 5.09 0.28 0.44 7.59 0.86 0.15
¿cbo 7.15 0.94 0.23
¿nber 7.47 0.96 -0.08
Table 2: Second Moments: Ramsey and Actual U.S. Fiscal Policy
Notes: (1) All second moments are relative to the percent deviations from steady-state
values. (2) The serial correlation is relative to the ¯rst lag. (3) ¿ is an average personal
income tax rate obtained by dividing personal tax revenues by total wage and salary
disbursements; ¿cbo is the e®ective federal individual income tax rate published by the CBO
for all income quintiles for the period 1979 to 2005; ¿nber is the U.S. federal average
marginal income tax rate on wages in the NBER TAXSIM model. This is an annual tax
rate, which we convert to quarterly by a simple linear interpolation method. (4) The
sources of the data are described in section 7.
To summarize, it is optimal to run budget de¯cits and raise the income tax rate in
response to an unanticipated increase in government spending shock while it is optimal to
run budget surpluses and raise the income tax rate in response to a positive technological
shock. Hence, under Ramsey ¯scal policy, budget surpluses are pro-cyclical with respect to
technological shocks but counter-cyclical with respect to government spending shocks. On
the other hand, labor income tax rates are pro-cyclical with respect to government spending
shocks but display a non-monotonic response to technological shocks, being pro-cyclical in
the short run but counter-cyclical in the long run. In terms of output
The non-monotonic response of the labor income tax response to a technological shock
is intriguing
are counter-cyclical with respect to technological shocks and pro-cyclical with respect
to government spending shocks. The counter-cyclicality of the tax rate with respect to
technological shocks helps to soften the (negative) response of labor supply and makes the
e®ect of the technological shock more expansionary on output.6
6Models with habit persistence predict that the Ramsey tax rate increases on impact in order to prevent
16The nature of the correlation of optimal ¯scal policy with output depends on the shock.
In general, budget surpluses are pro-cyclical and tax rates are counter-cyclical with respect
to output in the medium and long run. In the short run, however, output raises in response
to a government spending shock. Hence, budget surpluses are pro-cyclical and the tax
rate counter-cyclical with respect to output in response to a technological shock but budget
surpluses are counter-cyclical and the tax rate pro-cyclical with respect to output in response
to a government spending shock in the short run. Our simulations suggest that the optimal
tax rate is generally counter-cyclical over the business cycle.
6 Linear Fiscal Rules
Our goal is to compare actual ¯scal policy with optimal ¯scal policy. To do that we implement
a two-stage approach. First, we consider a class of simple, log-linear ¯scal rules and ¯nd
the values of its parameters that approximate well Ramsey ¯scal policy. We refer to it as
the theoretical rule. Second, we ¯nd the parameter values of the log-linear ¯scal rule that
approximates well actual ¯scal policy. We are going to refer to the latter as the empirical
rule.






















According to (28), the income tax rate is a log-linear function of real public debt and the
exogenous shocks that drive the business cycle in the model, namely government spending
and technology. We believe it is important to have real public debt in the ¯scal rule because
the steady-state level of the tax rate depends from the debt. Because the nature of the
exogenous shock (demand vs supply) is important in determining the optimal ¯scal response,
we introduced the shocks directly into the ¯scal rule. Other ¯scal rules are possible. Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2006) specify a tax-rate rule where the tax rate depends linearly on its own
lag and log deviations of government liabilities and output from their respective steady-state
values. Gal¶ ³ et al. (2007) posit a tax rule where taxes are lump sum and depend on the
deviations of government spending and public debt from their steady-state values. Bilbliie
et al. (2006) assume that the deviation of the structural de¯cit from zero depends on its lag,
the deviation of government spending and the level of public debt. We prefer not to include
macroeconomic variables such as output in the tax rule because such variables are linear
combinations of public debt, which is a state variable of our model. This would make it
di±cult to uniquely estimate the parameters of the tax rule in the light of the fact that the
correlation of the optimal tax rate with output depends on the type of shock. We also believe
that the ¯scal rule (28) is as information-demanding as any other rule that includes output
or the output gap among its determinants. In fact, government spending data is typically
consumption from jumping up and then it quickly falls below to its original level.
17available at the same frequency as output and a measure of the output gap implicitly provides
a measure of a productivity shock.
We pick the values of the parameters ®b;®g;®a that minimize the distance between the
theoretical impulse responses of our model under Ramsey ¯scal policy and the corresponding
impulse responses of the model where ¯scal policy follows the theoretical rule (28). The
length of the impulse responses is set to 20 quarters. We consider the set of variables
V = fdt;¿t;ct;yt;nt;wt;it;¼tg and compute the impulse response functions from a second-
order accurate approximation of the equilibrium conditions under Ramsey ¯scal policy of
the variables in V to the exogenous shocks of our model gt;at. Let these impulse responses
be ©R
i;t, for i = 1 to 8 and t = 1 to 20. In a similar fashion we let ©i;t(®) be the impulse
responses from a second-order accurate approximation of the model in which ¯scal policy
follows the theoretical rule (28), where ® = f®b;®g;®ag. Notice that impulse responses
in ©i;t(®) depend on the choice of the three parameters in the set ®. Then we de¯ne the
















where Wi;t are the weights assigned to each impulse response and period. We assign uniform
weights both across time and impulse responses for two reasons. First, we are interested
in matching both the short and medium run. Second, we do not have reason to give more
importance to one set of impulse responses over the others. As will be clear from the
discussion that follows, the results are robust to the particular choice of weights assigned
to each impulse response. The denominator in (29) is a constant re-scaling factor that
normalizes the distance to be equal to 1 when ©i;t(®) = 0 and zero if the theoretical rule
model replicates exactly the impulse responses of the model with Ramsey ¯scal policy.






















Figure 3 shows the impulse response functions to a government spending shock of the
variables in V under Ramsey ¯scal policy and under the theoretical ¯scal rule (30). Figure 4
shows the impulse response functions to a technological shock. The dynamics generated by
the theoretical ¯scal rule is remarkably close to that generated by the Ramsey ¯scal policy.
The distance D for the theoretical ¯scal rule is 0.008.
7 Methodological Issues for Empirical VARs
After having derived the Ramsey equilibrium and constructed a theoretical ¯scal that ap-
proximates it well, we bring the model to the data. We consider the family of ¯scal rules
speci¯ed in (28) and we choose the values for the parameters ®b;®g;®a so as to minimize the
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|||{ Theoretical Fiscal Rule - - - - - Ramsey Fiscal Policy
Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Government Spending Shock
Note: All variables are expressed in percentage point deviations from their steady-state
values.
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|||{ Theoretical Fiscal Rule - - - - - Ramsey Fiscal Policy
Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a Technological Shock
Note: All variables are expressed in percentage point deviations from their steady-state
values.
20distance between the empirical impulse responses and the impulse responses of the model
with the theoretical ¯scal rule. This estimated ¯scal rule summarizes how U.S. income tax
policy have been conducted in the last 25 years. We can then compare the theoretical and
estimated ¯scal rules and shed some light on how close actual ¯scal policy has been to its
optimal counterpart.
There are several ways to bring a theoretical model to the data. A ¯rst option is suggested
by Sargent (1989) and it consists in adding error terms to the equations of the DSGE
model. These errors can be interpreted as data measurement errors and the resulting hybrid
model can be directly estimated. In order to ¯t the data, however, the error terms must be
modeled as autocorrelated, which makes it di±cult to interpret them as measurement errors.
Furthermore, most of the persistence of the estimated model is due to the autocorrelation
of the error terms rather than to a good ¯t of the model to the data.
An alternative method combines the use of VARs and DSGE models to obtain estimates
of the deep structural parameters of the theoretical model. Gal¶ ³ et al. (2007) estimate
di®erent VARs (with 4 or 8 variables, including and excluding military spending, and using
di®erent sub-samples) and then calibrate a number of deep parameters of the theoretical
model on the basis of selected statistics from the VARs, such as the impact e®ect or the half-
life response of variables. Their calibrated model reproduces well the impact of government
spending on macroeconomic variables.
A more comprehensive method is proposed by Woodford and Rotemberg (1998). They
identify a monetary policy shock in a VAR on the basis of restrictions stemming from the
theoretical model and then minimize the distance between empirical and theoretical impulse
responses to the monetary shock. They focus on the short run responses of the model and
match the ¯rst four quarters after the shock. As only monetary shocks are considered, Wood-
ford and Rotemberg can identify separately a subset of the model's structural parameters of
interest.
Bilbiie et al. (2006) apply this methodology to a model that includes ¯scal policy and
minimize the distance between theoretical and empirical (VAR) impulse responses to a gov-
ernment spending shock. They identify shocks to government spending on the assumption
that the latter is not contemporaneously a®ected by the other variables in the VAR. Even
though their measure of distance gives more weight to short-run observations, the model ¯ts
quite well the long period too.
We estimate a VAR using quarterly U.S. data. We include per capita real gross domestic
product, per capital real government consumption, a measure of productivity consistent with
our production function, namely output per man-hour in the non-farm business economy,
non-farm business real hourly compensation, the average weekly hours of production workers
(monthly converted into quarterly) and the de¯cit/GDP ratio.7 To match the theoretical
impulse responses with their empirical counterparts, we must identify the impulse response
7The data sources are: (1) BLS for average weekly hours of production workers and nonfarm business
real hourly compensation; (2) BEA for real government cons per capita, gross domestic product per capita,
the de¯cit ratio (annualized de¯cit divided by annualized gdp); (3) BIS for the output per man-hour in the
nonfarm business economy.
21functions of the VAR in a way consistent with the hypotheses underlying the theoretical
model. Our model assumes that government spending and productivity are exogenous. This
implies that government spending and technology are una®ected by contemporaneous shocks
in other macroeconomic variables. Therefore, a consistent identi¯cation scheme assumes that
government spending and productivity are not a®ected contemporaneously by the shocks in
the other variables contained in the VAR.8 This exogeneity assumption is implemented by
placing government expenditure and productivity as the ¯rst variables in the VAR and using





































where X is the vector of macroeconomic variables and A(L) is a matrix of free parameters.
The contemporaneous matrix is not block triangular because of the presence of an extra zero
that forces the contemporaneous e®ect of g and a to be zero.
We remain close to the existing literature and estimate a recursive VAR (using a Cholesky
decomposition) that imposes the following identifying assumptions: (1) government spending
is not contemporaneously a®ected by the other variables in the VAR (the two zeros in the
¯rst row of the contemporaneous matrix); (2) productivity is not contemporaneously a®ected
by the other variables X in the VAR (the last zero in the second row). Hence, we do not
impose the additional restriction that government spending does not contemporaneously
a®ect productivity (the ¯rst zero in the second row), but we test it. It turns out that
the condition is indeed veri¯ed and that a swap in estimation order between government
spending and productivity would not signi¯cantly in°uence the impulse responses.
We considered alternative identi¯cation schemes (long-run restrictions and a mix of short-
and long-run restrictions) but opted for a Cholesky decomposition for a number of reasons.
First, as suggested earlier, our model assumes that government spending and technology are
una®ected by contemporaneous shocks in the other macroeconomic variables. Second, there
are no clear long-run restrictions for a government spending shock, whose permanent e®ect
on the debt level depends on the response of the tax rate. Third, the scheme that identi¯es
technological shocks as the only ones having a permanent e®ect on labor productivity in
the long run is inconsistent with our model, which is expressed in deviations from a steady
state, and with deterministic de-trending of the data, as we do given our relatively short
estimation sample.
8 Empirical Estimate of the Linear Fiscal Rule
This section aims to ¯nd the parameter values of our simple ¯scal rule that replicate well
the empirical impulse response functions derived from the VAR analysis described above.9
8Blanchard and Perotti (2001), Fat¶ as and Mihov (2001) and Gal¶ ³ et al. (2007) have also used such
identi¯cation scheme.
9All variables are de-trended using a Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter.
22We use our matching technique by minimizing the distance between the impulse responses
generated by the model under the tax rule (28) and the corresponding ones of the VAR. We
consider a total of ten impulse responses, namely the responses of output, hours worked, real
wage and de¯cit as percent of GDP to a government spending shock and to a productivity
shock.10 The ¯rst 20 periods of each impulse response are matched. As we discussed earlier,
we assign equal weights to all periods and impulse responses.






















According to our ¯ndings, the U.S. tax rate has been increased in response to a positive
technological shock and to a positive government spending shock. On the other hand, the
tax rate has responded negatively to upwards movements of the government debt. Figures
5 and 6 show the empirical impulse responses and those derived by our model when rule
(31) is implemented. The matching is good for most of the impulse responses. Overall, the
impulse responses generated under (31) explain almost 74% of the dynamics implied by the
VAR analysis. Therefore our empirical rule can be considered a good approximation of U.S.
income tax policy in the last 20 years.
First, a positive shock (1%) to government spending generates a rise in output, with an
impact e®ect of around 0.2% and an implied impact multiplier of about 1 and a maximum
multiplier of 1:06 after two periods. This multiplier is comparable to Blanchard and Perotti
(2002), who ¯nd an impact multiplier of around one. As in their papers, the e®ect is quite
persistent, with a half-life of about nine quarters. Turning to the same impulse response
under the tax rule derived above, it lies almost entirely within the plus and minus one-
standard deviation bands. According to the model, output increases on impact by around
0.12% and displays a high degree of persistence although it returns to the initial level at a
slightly faster pace with respect to the impulse response from the VAR.
Second, as in Gal¶ ³ et al. (2007), after a small, negative impact response, the real wage
rises persistently and signi¯cantly in response to an increase in government spending, with
a half-life of approximately 14 quarters. In this respect the ¯scal rule is not able to fully
capture the dynamics of real wages. As a matter of fact the impulse response of our empirical
rule is practically °at. The dynamic response of hours worked is positive and signi¯cant on
impact, a response to higher real wage. The model-based impulse response captures well the
initial positive response of hours but it predicts a monotonic return to the steady state.
Third, a government spending shock increases the de¯cit ratio in the short run. The
implied ¯scal multiplier of a 1% increase in government spending is 0:86 at impact and
1:02 at its peak after two periods.The ¯scal rule does a good job in mimicking the de¯cit
10Our model, like other standard models, does not match well the dynamic response of private consumption
to a government spending shock, as pointed out by Gal¶ ³ et al. (2007). For this reason, we do not include
private consumption in our set of matched impulse responses, as it would worsen the match of all our
macroeconomic variables while still doing a poor job with private consumption.



















































Deficit as % of GDP
- - - - - Estimated in the VAR ||{ Rule
Figure 5: Impulse Responses to a Government Spending Shock
Note: Estimated in the VAR and theoretical impulse responses to a xx standard deviation
innovation to government spending. The dotted lines are the con¯dence interval around
the estimated impulse responses calculated as §1 standard deviations of empirical
distributions. Sample period for the estimated VAR: 1955:1 to 2007:4. The horizontal axis
represents quarters after the shock.
24dynamics, as the impulse response of the theoretical model lies completely within the +/-
one-standard deviation bands.
The e®ects of a technology shock cannot be compared with the extant literature, as we
are the ¯rst to match these impulse responses. A positive 1% shock to productivity increases
output by about 0.5% on impact, with the e®ect remaining signi¯cant for 10 quarters. The
corresponding impulse response under the empirical rule replicates well the dynamics under
the VAR both on impact and in the longer horizon although with a larger magnitude. The
real wage increases in the ¯rst two quarters by 0.6%, with a peak e®ect of 0.7%. Hours worked
decline on impact and remain signi¯cantly below equilibrium throughout the length of the
impulse response. Our empirical ¯scal rule captures well the negative short-run response
of hours worked to a technological shock, although it predicts a monotone response and
is therefore unable to capture the peak e®ect after 10 quarters displayed by the impulse
response of the VAR. The empirical rule also does a good job in capturing the response of
the real wage, except in overstating such e®ect in the ¯rst two periods. Finally, a positive
productivity shock has second round e®ects (via macroeconomic variables) on the government
budget, signi¯cantly reducing the de¯cit ratio. The impulse response under the rule slightly
overstates the response of the de¯cit in the ¯rst two period, but it performs very well from
period 3 onwards.
Comparing the empirical rule with the theoretical rule (30) derived from the Ramsey
equilibrium, it is clear that actual ¯scal policies have not been optimal in the United States
in the time horizon of our sample. The empirical rule suggests that the labor income tax
rate has fallen by 0.09 percentage points in response to a 1 percentage point increase in real
public debt in the last twenty years. Optimal ¯scal policy, on the other hand, predicts an
increase of the labor income tax rate of 0.06 percentage points. This ¯nding raises some
questions as to the long-run sustainability of U.S. ¯scal policy.
As for the response to government spending, ®g, the empirical and theoretical rules have
the same sign but the magnitude of the response in the empirical rule is almost three times
greater than that in the theoretical one. This implies that actual U.S. income tax rates have
overreacted to government spending changes.
The most problematic estimate to interpret is the one of ®a, which measures the response
of the tax rate to productivity changes. Under optimal ¯scal policy, the labor income tax
rate should fall by 0.17 percentage points in response to a 1 percentage point increase in
technology. The estimated ¯scal rule implies that income tax rate have increased 0.53 per-
centage points in response to the shock. This suggests that labor income tax rates have
been excessively pro-cyclical with respect to technological shocks and therefore with respect
to output. This result is clearly in line with the ¯nding in table 2 that U.S. labor income
tax rates have been positively correlated with output over the business cycle while optimal
ones should be negatively correlated. It appears that U.S. labor income tax rates have been
raised during periods with output above trend and cut in periods with output below trend.
As suggested earlier, this policy is suboptimal because it further reduces the supply of labor
following a technological shock, thereby limiting its expansionary e®ect on the economy.
Figure 7 shows the responses of the labor income tax rate under the theoretical and the

























































Deficit as % of GDP
- - - - - Estimated in the VAR ||{ Rule
Figure 6: Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock
Note: Estimated in the VAR and theoretical impulse responses to a xx standard deviation
innovation to government spending. The dotted lines are the con¯dence interval around
the estimated impulse responses calculated as §1 standard deviations of empirical
distributions. Sample period for the estimated VAR: 1955:1 to 2007:4. The horizontal axis
represents quarters after the shock.






















- - - - - Theoretical Rule ||| Estimated Rule
Figure 7: Impulse Responses to a Government Spending Shock (left) and a Productivity
Shock (right)
empirical ¯scal rule. The dynamics of the tax rate under the two ¯scal rules are clearly
di®erent. Following a government spending shock, the estimated rule suggests that the tax
rate is raised in the short run, but lowered in the long run, the latter stemming from the
negative response of the tax rate to a change in government debt. Following a technological
shock, the tax rate is raised instantaneously and then it keeps on increasing. Once again, the
medium-run dynamics is dictated by the negative response of the tax rate to public debt,
which also makes the dynamic system unstable.
9 Robustness
We have estimated our empirical VAR using two lags, as suggested by the selection criteria
and in contrast with some of the existing literature that uses four lags.11 To check if our
results are robust to the number of lags included in the VAR, we re-estimate our VAR using
four lags and performed again the matching of the empirical rule. The rules of the coe±cient
are reported in the following table:
®b ®g ®a Distance
2 lags -0.09 0.31 0.53 0.37
4 lags -0.10 0.09 0.44 0.37
Table 3: Estimated Fiscal Rule with 2 and 4 Lags in the VAR
The rule matching the 4-lags VAR is similar to that matching the 2-lags VAR, though
®g is smaller. In any case, the qualitative features of the rule are preserved. The ¯t remains
similar and good, supporting our choice of the more parsimonious speci¯cation.
11(Gal¶ ³ et al. (2007), Bilbiie et al. (2006), Perotti (2004) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
27Our class of simple, linear ¯scal rules relates taxes to debt and to the shocks in the most



























We re-estimate our theoretical and empirical ¯scal rule using the speci¯cation above. The
following parameter values we obtain are summarized in table 4 where, for ease of exposition,
we report again the parameter values for the speci¯cation with the lagged tax rate
®b ®g ®a ®¿ Distance
Theoretical without ¿t¡1 0.06 0.11 -0.17 { 0.01
Theoretical with ¿t¡1 0.01 0.04 -0.15 0.57 0.00
Empirical without ¿t¡1 -0.08 0.31 0.53 { 0.37
Empirical with ¿t¡1 -0.03 0.11 0.33 0.58 0.36
Table 4: Theoretical and Estimated Fiscal Rule with and without the lagged tax rate
The inclusion of the lagged tax rate takes into account part of the persistence of the
system, thereby reducing the size of the other coe±cients of the rule. This result is valid for
both the theoretical and the empirical rule. Once again, the qualitative features of the rule
remain unaltered and the ¯t remains good.
The introduction of habit persistence and capital are likely to a®ect only the ¯rst few
periods of the response of the labor income tax and budget surpluses. Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2006) show that the labor income tax rate falls for a couple of quarters and then
increases in response to a government spending shock while it increases for a couple of
quarters and then it falls in response to a technological shock. We believe the qualitative
¯ndings of our paper will survive the introduction of these features.
We have assumed that monetary policy follows an interest rate rule that features a muted
response to output. Under Ramsey ¯scal policy, raising the parameter Áy to 0.5 and lowering
the parameter Ái to 0, as originally suggested by Taylor (1993), is still going to: a) raise the
income tax rate and generate de¯cits in response to a government spending shock; b) reduce
the income tax rate generate surpluses in response to a technological shock. However, the
short-run dynamic responses of the tax rate and surpluses depend critically on the values
of the parameters of the interest-rate rule. This suggests that monetary-¯scal interactions
are important.12 At the same time, our empirical VARs would deliver inconsistent results
and suggest the presence of a structural break in 1983:1 if we extend the sample to include
data prior to that date. Hence, we leave the analysis of the period pre-1983 and alternative
interest-rate rule to future works.
12As suggested already in the literature. See for example Dixit and Lambertini (2003).
2810 Conclusions
We have studied the optimal response of taxes to temporary shocks to technology and gov-
ernment spending in an economy characterized by a number of frictions and used the result
as a benchmark to evaluate actual ¯scal policy in the United States. Both optimal and
actual ¯scal policies are summarized by a simple and linear tax rule whose coe±cients are
derived by minimizing the distance between impulse responses generated under the rule and
alternatively by optimal ¯scal policy and by empirical VARs.
Regarding optimal ¯scal policies, we have three main ¯ndings. First, the optimal labor
income tax rate has to increase in response to a positive government spending shock and
decrease in response to a positive technological shock. However, the optimal labor income
tax rate has limited volatility over the business cycle. Second, the optimal labor income tax
rate has to respond positively to an increase in the public debt. Third, it is optimal running
budget de¯cits in response to a positive government spending shock, determining an short-
run positive e®ect on output. Therefore it is not always optimal to implement pro-cyclical
budget balances with respect to output.
As for actual tax policy in the United States, our ¯ndings can be summarized as follows.
First, the tax rate responds positively both to a positive government spending shock (as pre-
dicted by optimal ¯scal policy) and, contrarily to the optimal rule, to a positive technological
shock. We believe therefore that the U.S. tax policy has been conducted in a sub-optimal
manner by having been \excessively" counter-cyclical. Second, budget surpluses are small
and barely signi¯cant following a technological shock, while at the same time the output
response is lower than predicted under optimal ¯scal policy. Third, U.S. tax rates have
responded negatively to public debt, unlike what is predicted by optimal ¯scal policy: In-
creasing public debt ratios have not triggered higher tax rates. Therefore, it is questionable
whether U.S. ¯scal policy can be sustained in the long-run.
The analysis carried out in this paper lends itself to a number of extensions. The model
has been kept rather simple in order to develop the matching methodology in the cleanest
and easiest way. However, a number of features can be added in order to capture several
patterns shown in the data. Without been exhaustive, we can mention the introduction of
rule-of-thumb consumers, as in Gal¶ ³ (2007) or Bilbiie et al (2006), in order to capture the
positive response of private consumption to a positive government spending shock shown in
the data.
The empirical analysis can also be extended to other regions. In fact, it would be in-
teresting to replicate the study for the European Union or the Euro Area. However, good
quarterly ¯scal data are lacking at the moment. As an intermediate step, it is our inten-
tion to start with country studies selecting those European countries where data availability
allows good empirical work.
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